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Henry Wirz and Andersonville:
Tue Career of the Most
Controversial Swiss American
by Albert Winkler

While many Americans of Swiss descent have made valuable contributions to the development of the United States, Henry Wirz has often
been viewed with disdain . He was the commander of the infamous Andersonville prison where nearly 13,000 Union prisoners died during the
American Civil War, and he was one of the two men executed for war
crimes relating to that conflict. Despite his conviction in court, much
controversy surrounds his actions at Andersonville, and many writers
have either condemned or praised him. This paper will review the career
of Henry Wirz, examine his conduct at Andersonville, and analyze his
trial to see if he was fairly convicted, or if he was condemned for the
need of a scapegoat.
Although Wirz was an important historical figure, some scholars of
the Swiss in America have ignored him entirely. Prominent Americans
of Swiss Origin and Swiss in American Life do not mention Wirz even
though the latter study includes enemies of the United States, John Andre (1750-1780) and Auguste Prevost (1723-1786) . Andre was a British
spy during the War of Independence who was hanged for his complicity
in the treason of Benedict Arnold, and Prevost was a British general in
the same conflict who inflicted a severe defeat on the Americans at the
siege of Savannah, Georgia, in 1779 .1
Henry Wirz was born in Zurich on November 25, 1823. He wanted
to be a physician, but his father, Hans Caspar Wirz, wanted his son to
1

Prominent Americans of Swiss Origin (New York: White , 1932) and Swiss in
American Life (Zurich: Millier, I 977) , pp . 32-3 . Swiss biographers more often include
Wirz in their studies . See, Karl Lilond, Schweizer in Amerika (Olten: Walter, 1979) , pp.
131-8 .
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become a minister. As Henry later admitted, "My father wanted me to
study for the pulpit; I did not like it. ... I had an inclination to study medicine, and he [his father] would not let me ." The two men compromised,
and the younger Wirz became a merchant. He married Emilie Oschwald
on Sept. 15, 1845, and she bore him two children, Louise Emilie in 1847
and Paul Emil in 1849.2
Early in 1847, Hans Caspar Wirz noticed discrepancies in the accounts of his business, and Henry was arrested on January 12 and found
guilty of fraud and embezzlement on April 3. He was sentenced to four
years in jail and went to the btenbach penitentiary. Due to ill health, the
prisoner was released on June 6, 1848, and the city changed the remainder of his punishment to banishment from the Zurich Canton for twelve
years. He then migrated to the United States, landing in New York in
April 1849. His wife divorced him in 1853 for abandonment. 3
Wirz went to Kentucky where he met and married Elizabeth Savells
Wolf whose husband had died, leaving her with two young girls, Susie
and Cornelia Wolf. The couple spoke their vows on May 28, 1854 at
Cadiz, Kentucky, and they had two more daughters before the outbreak
of the Civil War, but one died prior to the conflict.4
Henry Wirz was in Louisiana at the outbreak of the Civil War in
1861 and joined the Confederate army as a private. His unit arrived in
Virginia in the summer of 1861 and was given guard duty over Union
prisoners in Richmond. Brigadier General John H. Winder, who had
responsibility for the Union captives in that city, noticed Wirz's diligence in making lists of prisoners, and Winder soon made him a sergeant with additional duties . Wirz claimed he fought in the Battle of
Fair Oaks (Seven Pines) May 31-June 1, 1862, where "I was wounded
by a piece of shell. ... and have nearly lost the use of my right arm." It
2

Henry Wirz, " His Life and History from his own Lips," Nov. 8, I 865 New York
Herald , Nov. 9 , 1865 . Henry Wirz "Letter," in U. S. Secretary of War, The Trial of
Henry Wirz 40'h Cong. , 2d sess., House Executive Documents [Washington, D.C ., 1868],
p. 17 . Hereafter cited as Trial . See also, Rolf Kieser "Hauptmann Henry Wirz und die
Hintergriinde des Andersonville-Prozesses," Schweizerische Zeitschriftfiir Geschichte,
18, no . I ( 1968): p. 48; Orvid L. Futch , History of Andersonville Prison (np: University
of Florida, 1968), p. 16; and Ruedi Studer, Der Prozess gegen Captain Henry Wirz
(Nordhausen : Bautz, 2006) , pp. 40-1.
3
Kieser, "Wirz," 48 and Futch, Andersonville, p. 16 .
4
Wirz , "Life," Studer, Der Prozess, p. 40 , and William Marvel , Andersonville:
the Last Depot (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp . 35-6.
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Captain Henry Wirz, C.SA.
Courtesy: Library of Congress
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never healed, and the wound hurt him for the rest of his life. Despite his
disability, Wirz advanced to the rank of captain on June 12, 1862, and
he continued to work with prisoners.5
In 1863, Wirz received a furlough. "I went to Europe and had
my wound operated upon at Paris. The doctor there thought that all
the dead bone had come out." But the operation failed because "the
wound broke open again" three or four months later. When Wirz returned on January 20 , 1864 , General Winder ordered him to report to
Camp Sumter near Andersonville, Georgia, to help with the prisonerof-war camp .6
The tragedy of Andersonville was caused by the policies on prisoners during the Civil War. A system of prisoner exchange broke down
over the issue of African American captives in 1862 because the Confederacy refused to treat them as legitimate prisoners of war. By the
end of 1863, the number of prisoners held by each side rose sharply.
The conditions were poor in the prison camps both North and South,
and mortality rates were high. According to the most reliable numbers:
"211 ,411 Union soldiers were captured during the Civil War of which
16,668 were paroled [released] on the field and 30,218 died while in
captivity; and that 462 ,634 Confederate soldiers were captured during
the war, of which number 247,769 were paroled on the field and 25 ,976
died while in captivity." Subtracting those who were released immediately, 194,743 Union soldiers were incarcerated, and 30 ,218 died or
15.5%. 214,865 Confederate soldiers were also held, and 25,976 died or
12%.7 This meant that the conditions were similar in the camps of both
the North and South because the death rates were comparable .
Many Confederate prisons were in or near Richmond , but the
city suffered from shortages of all kinds by 1863, challenging public
officials to meet the needs of civilians, soldiers, and prisoners of war.
Confederate officials decided to remove the prisoners from the na5

Wirz, " Life;" Wirz "Letter" in Trial, I 7; Studer, p. 42 ; Marvel , Andersonville ,
p. 36; and The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies, 128 vol s. (Washington, D.C .. : Government Printing Offi ce ,
1880-1 90 I) series 2, vol. 3: p. 7 I I. All citations in this work are from series 2, which
deals with prisoners of war. Hereafter cited as OR.
6
Studer, pp . 37-8 , Wirz, " Life ," and Wirz, Trial , p. 804 .
7
William B. Hesseltine , Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology (New
York: Ungar, 1964) , pp . 69-11 3, 256.
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tion 's capital. Jefferson Davis justified the choice of Andersonville as
a new prison. It "was selected, after careful investigation ... it was in
a high pine-woods region, in a productive farming country, had never
been devastated by the enemy, was well watered and near to Americus,
a central depot for collecting the tax in kind and purchasing provisions
for our armies." 8
The location of the camp was poorer than originally assumed.
Military action in 1864 hampered the procuring of supplies, a problem
made worse by Union cavalry raids on Georgia's rail system. Also, the
flow of the stream running through the camp slowed by the summer of
1864, making fresh water difficult to get. The compound was designed
to hold ten thousand men, and shortages of supplies meant the prisoners were poorly housed. When the first captives arrived on February 27,
1864, only a stockade was in place with walls fifteen feet high, enclosing sixteen and a half acres. There were few grist mills in the area to
grind grain, and too few men to drive cattle to the prison, so the food
8
Jefferson Davis, Andersonville and other War-Prisons (New York: Belford,
1890), [pp. 1-2]. Hereafter cited as Davis, Andersonville.
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supply was inadequate. Four hundred captives were soon arriving daily,
taxing the ability of the Confederate authorities to care for them. 9
The average number of men in the prison was 7,500 in March,
and there were 10,000 men in the stockade in April. The numbers increased to 22,291 in June, to 29,030 in July, and to 31,678 at the end of
that month. In August, the prison held its greatest number of captives:
33,006. The number of deaths also rose rapidly. 283 prisoners died in
March and 576 in April. The number of deaths in May was 708; in June
1,201; and in July 1,817. The late summer months of August (2,993
deaths) and September (2,677 deaths) were the most severe . In October,
1,595 died; November499; December 165; January (1865) 197; February 147; and March 108. The last recorded deaths were in April, when
28 men died. According to this list, 12,994 (other historians state 12,913
or 12,949) men died at Andersonville from the 41,000 to 45,000 who
Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 133-5. See also OR vol. 6, pp . 965-6, 992-3 ,
1000 , 1043.
9

Andersonville .
Courtesy: National Archives.
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were incarcerated there , and the death rate was 28.9% to 31.6%. The
men died from many maladies including exposure, hunger, unsanitary
water, scurvy, and poor hygiene. 10
The Confederate congress passed a law on May 12, 1861 mandating that all prisoners of war be given the same rations "in quantity and
quality as those furnished enlisted men in the army of the Confederacy."
But the South often could only supply its soldiers with inadequate rations. Jefferson Davis wrote that the reasons for the high death rates in
Southern prisons included "insufficient means of transportation," too
few guards due to the lack of manpower in the South, and too few physicians available for prison service."
The Confederacy faced acute transportation problems late in the war.
Many horses and mules were taken to support the army, and the rail system
was inadequate to meet the needs placed on it, resulting in food shortages.
In 1863, food riots broke out in many cities including Richmond, Mobile,
and Atlanta. Confederate soldiers often took desperate measures to get food
as John 0. Casler wrote, "We would get them [rations] from the [Union]
dead . I have been so hungry that I have cut the blood off from crackers and
eaten them." 12 The Confederacy could not feed its people or properly supply its army, and the Union captives suffered as well.
When Wirz arrived at Andersonville on March 25, 1864, he faced
severe problems. The administration of Fort Sumter was inefficient, and
three independent officers had control of the region outside the compound: General Winder, Col. George Cooper Gibbs, and Lt. Col. Alexander W. Persons . These men bickered with each other, were often absent,
and did little to solve the major problems of the camp. Without their aid,
Captain Wirz was left to resolve many pressing problems, but he only had
command of the stockade, and he could do little about the availability of
supplies because he had no authority to requisition them. 13

10
Hesseltine , pp . 143, 146, 152; Marvel, p. 238; Trial , pp. 629-40; and Robert
Scott Davis, Ghosts and Shadows of Andersonville (Macon: Mercer, 2006), pp. 30, 72.
Hereafter cited as Davis, Ghosts.
11
Davis, Andersonville, [pp. 2-3, 7].
12
Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil
War South (Cambridge: Harvard , 20 I0), pp . 178-93 and John 0 . Casler, Four Years in
the Stonewall Brigade (Girard, Kan .: Appeal, 1906), p. 208.
13
Lonnie R. Speer, Portals to Hell: Military Prisons of the Civil War,
(Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1997) , p. 260; and Davis, Ghosts, pp. 28-9.
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Yet he worked with intelligence and energy. "Wirz was a constant presence in Camp Sumter, and he worked tirelessly to improve its
conditions." The stream that went through the compound had become
an "open sewer" used as a latrine by the inmates . Wirz assigned men
to shovel the filth from the stream daily, and he established two dams
along the creek, the higher dike for drinking water and the lower for
bathing. He wrote that the bread issued to the captives was "of such
inferior quality, consisting fully of one-sixth of husk, that it is almost
unfit for use and increasing dysentery and other bowel complaints" and
recommended that the flour be sifted to remove impurities. He built a
bake house, so more cooked food would be available , and he got the
prisoners to brew a crude beer made from corn mash and molasses to
control scurvy. Wirz also asked for more buckets to issue "rice , beans ,
vinegar, and molasses" to the men .14
Wirz continued to improve conditions, and he "brought order to
the chaos of the camp ." The Captain "tried to compile accurate rolls,"
and he made the distribution of rations more orderly by dividing the
men into messes of ninety men each. To deal with problems of overcrowding, Wirz had "the original stockade ... enlarged by ten acres in
June." 15 He has received just praise for his efforts. "Until the day of his
arrest he was to exert every effort to alleviate the conditions within the
camp and to stem the ever-rising death toll." Lt. Col. Persons observed
Wirz at Andersonville and stated, "I know he labored indefatigably"
to help the prisoners .16 Wirz likely saved thousands of men who would
have otherwise perished , and there was little if anything more he could
have done to alleviate the men's suffering.
Wirz was often harsh as he explained, "Anybody who knows anything about military matters knows that one in command of thirty-five
thousand men has to be strict." At his trial, Wirz was condemned for

14

Charles W. Sanders, Jr., While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons
of the Civil War (Baton Rouge: LSU, 2005), p . 212; and OR vol. 7, pp . 89, 135-9, and
207 . See also Darrett B. Rutman , "The War Crimes and Trial of Henry Wirz ," Civil
War History 6 (June 1960): no . 2, p. I 19, and James Madi son Page, A True History of
Andersonville Prison: A Defense of Major Henry Wirz (New York: Neal, 1908), pp.
101-2.
15
Rutman, "Henry Wirz," p. 119; Davis , Ghosts, p. 27 ; and Bowie in OR, vol. 7,
pp. 136-7.
16
Rutman, "Henry Wirz," p. 119; and Trial, p. 463 .
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the nature of the punishment he inflicted on the prisoners. A few men
were whipped, more were "bucked and gagged" (tied up), and many
were shackled to cannon balls often weighing 32 pounds. Most often
men were placed in stocks. By the standards of the war, the punitive
measures at Andersonville were not severe, and the Union army often
inflicted "brutal punishments" on its own men that left some of them
"permanently disabled." 17 As punishment, many men often faced little
more than Wirz's infamous profanity.
Many Union prisoners accused Wirz of brutality, stating he needlessly caused the men to suffer, but many of these accounts were fabrications. John McElroy, a Union captive, wrote the most influential narrative of the camp. He defamed Wirz stating that he was guilty of many
crimes including "cruelly beating and murdering" captives, but recent
historians have denounced the memoir as "a prison novel," which was
"preposterously exaggerated." 18 A few Union prisoners defended Wirz,
including James Madison Page, Herman A. Braun, and Edward Wellington Boate. The latter wrote, "Wirz was as kind-hearted a man as
I ever met." At his trial, a number of former prisoners testified in his
defense . 19
Three physicians gave testimony at Wirz's trial and stated that
his wounds kept him from committing many of the crimes ascribed
to him . Dr. C. M . Ford described Wirz's right arm, "It is swollen and
inflamed, ulcerated in three places; and it has appearance of having
been broken. In addition to that, I believe that portions of both bones
of the arm are dead." Ford continued, "I should think him incapable of
knocking a man, or lifting a very heavy instrument of any kind, without doing great injury to the arm." Referring to Wirz's left arm , Ford
said, "There is a very large scar on the left shoulder, and ... the deltoid
[shoulder] muscle is entirely gone ... only the front part of the muscle

17

Wirz, "Life." For examples see , Trial, pp. 46 , 117,177 , 209 , 214, 218 , 318,321,
507, and 768. Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox (New York: Doubleday, 1953),
pp . 32-3 .
18 John McElroy, Andersonville: a Story of Rebel Military Prisons (Toledo: Locke,
I 879), p. 64 I. Davis , Ghosts, p. 31; and Futch, p. I 38.
19
Page, A True History; Herman A. Braun, Andersonville: An Object Lesson on
Protection , a Critical Sketch (Milwaukee: Fahsel, 1892); and Boate, "The True Story
of Andersonville Told by a Federal Prisoner," Southern Historical Society Papers I0
(1882) : p. 28.
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Trial of Captain Wirz.
Courtesy: Harp er's Weekly.

of the shoulder remaining." Ford also testified that Wirz had "dark
brown scars" on his legs from scurvy. 20 The doctors also noted that
Wirz was sick and absent from his post at Andersonville throughout
August and most of September 1864 when many of the crimes supposedly took place .
Jefferson Davis blamed the Union for the many deaths of prisoners. "The real cause of all the protracted sufferings of prisoners, North
and South, is directly due to the inhuman refusal of the Federal Government to exchange prisoners of war." The Union could have helped its
men and saved many lives by sending aid or exchanging captives, but
it refused and blamed the Confederacy. As Hesseltine argued, "Official
propaganda was undertaken to convince the North that exchange was
impossible-that it had been stopped by the South-and that the southern20

Trial, pp. 657, 803-5 .
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ers were actuated by a determination to destroy the lives of the prisoners
in their hands." 2 1
General Ulysses S. Grant explained, "It is hard on our men held
in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those
left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man we hold, when released
on parole or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us." 22 Grant's
argument only had merit if the Confederate soldiers were superior to
Union troops because prisoner exchange would bring an equal number
of men to the federal army.
Grant's belief that prisoner exchanges helped the South more
than the North also overlooked issues including recruiting soldiers
and Union morale. Lincoln received many letters begging him to send
relief to the prisoners or to exchange them . General William T. Sherman wrote, "I get one hundred letters a day almost asking me to effect the exchange or release of ... Prisoners." 23 The prisoners expected
their government to do everything possible for them, and many soldiers felt betrayed. Some of these men directed their anger at President Lincoln. William Keys wrote in August 1864, "Father Abraham
[Lincoln] I wish you had my ration of wood to boil coffee for your
family , I think you would soon bring on an exchange." He added on
September 4 in dismay over Lincoln's refusal to exchange prisoners,
"neither experience nor humanity demand or justify our suffering."
Another soldier stated, "If the government don't get us out they may
go to the Devil with Abraham Lincoln." 24
On July 20, 1864, the prisoners at Andersonville wrote a petition
to their government requesting their exchange . Wirz released a six-man
commission of Union soldiers led by Edward Wellington Boate to carry the petition to the North . Boate recorded , "it distresses me to state
that the representatives of thirty-eight thousand Union prisoners were
treated with silent contempt, the President [Lincoln] declining to see
21

Davis, Andersonville , [p . 11] and William B. Hesseltine , "The Propaganda
Literature of Confederate Prisons ," The Journal of Southern History, vol. I , no . I (Feb.
1935): p. 60.
22
OR, vol. 7, p. 607 .
23
Hesseltine , p. 226; and William T. Sherman, Aug. 9, 1864, in Selected
Correspondence of the Civil War (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina, 1999), p.
685 .
24
William Farand Keys " Diary," Rutgers University Libraries and Marvel , pp .
147-8.
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them or have anything to do with them!!!" He added that the policy not
to exchange prisoners was the "quintessence of inhumanity, a disgrace
to the Administration that carried it out, and a blot upon the country ....
You abandoned your brave men in the hour of their cruelest need. They
fought for the Union, and you reached no hand out to save the old faithful , loyal , and devoted servants of the country." 25
On January 24 , 1864 the Confederate commissioner for prisoner
exchange, Robert Ould, proposed that each side send its own doctors to
oversee the prisoners held by the enemy and "shall be permitted to take
charge of their health and comfort ... with power to receive and distribute such contributions of money, food and clothing and medicines as
may be forwarded for the relief of the prisoners." 26 This proposal gave
the Union the opportunity to care for their own men in Confederate
prisons , but the offer was ignored.
General Sherman's Georgia campaign gave the Union an opportunity to aid or release captives in Confederate prisons. He marched
virtually unopposed across Georgia in November and December 1864
and into South and North Carolina the following year, but he made no
attempt to release or bring aid to the Union prisoners nearby. As Robert S. Davis has observed , "Before the year [1865] ended, the United
States government tried Wirz for war crimes and hanged him . General
Sherman, more responsible than Wirz for prisoners remaining at Andersonville, however, received a hero's welcome in Washington and a full
military review." 27
In September 1864, Confederate officials began removing the captives at Andersonville to other locations. In April of 1865, Wirz sent
about one thousand men per day to the Union lines, and the camp was
abandoned in May. To defray criticism of its refusal to aid and exchange
prisoners, the federal government sought someone to blame and punish
for the many deaths. As commander of Union prisoners in the South,
General Winder was the logical person, but he died in February 1865
and could not be prosecuted .28 But Wirz was accessible, and he was
25

Italics in the original. See Boate , "Andersonville," p . 31 ; and Marvel, pp .

148-9 .
26

OR, vol. 6, pp. 871-2.
Davis , Ghosts , p. 161 .
28
Arch Fredric Bl akey General John H. Winder (Gainesville: University of
Florida, 1990) , 20 I.
27
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Wirz on the Scaffold
Courtesy: Library of Congress.

arrested on May 7 and brought to Washington, D.C. , where his trial
started on August 23, 1865.
The trial was illegal because it was run by a military commission. Civilian courts were still operating meaning military courts
were unnecessary. Additionally, Wirz never served in the federal
army and was not subject to its justice system. The Constitution also
states , "The trial of all crimes ... shall be by Jury; and such Trial
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed," meaning it had to be a jury trial and had to take place
in Georgia. (Article 3, Sec. 2, para. 3) The Fifth Amendment adds
that the trial of a "capital" or "infamous crime" is illegal "unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." No such jury met.
Additionally, all the Confederate soldiers in Georgia were pardoned
under the surrender terms of General Joseph E. Johnston on April
26, 1865 which specified that all military personnel "will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol47/iss2/8
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authorities ." 29 These legalities were ignored in the effort to convict
Wirz.
The first charge of the indictment stated that Wirz had conspired
with Confederate officials to kill Union prisoners, "by subjecting [them]
to torture and great suffering, by confining in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters ... by compelling the use of impure water and by furnishing insufficient and unwholesome food." The court also charged Wirz
with personally murdering thirteen Union soldiers, but the names of
each alleged victim was "unknown ," some of the supposed crimes took
place when Wirz was away from the prison, and one act involved a violent assault which he was physically incapable of administering. 30 Wirz
was so ill during his trial that he had to be carried into court, and he was
unable to sit up during the proceedings.
The prosecution, headed by Norton P. Chipman, used the large
financial and legal resources of the federal government to prosecute
the case, and 148 witnesses testified over 63 days. Some Union soldiers who testified at the trial perjured themselves and gave unreliable
and exaggerated testimony, and the trial record "runs heavy with some
of the most absurd hearsay that any American judge ever permitted to
stand ." 3 1
The defense requested many witnesses who were not allowed to
testify, and Robert Ould, who came to give evidence on prisoner exchange , was ordered to leave the city or face arrest. No testimony was
allowed that questioned the policies of the Union, reflected poorly on
President Lincoln, or criticized the North for not exchanging prisoners.
Most of the testimony centered on the conditions of the camp, implying
that Wirz caused the captives to suffer needlessly, but the court was unsuccessful in proving its main accusations. "His trial failed to produce
any credible account of his acting with personal cruelty or evidence of
his role in any conspiracy." 32 In his diary, Wirz expressed dismay on
how witnesses for the defense were discredited. "What a mockery this
trial is, they say they are anxious that I should have justice done to me,
and then when a witness is put on the stand to give testimony they try
29
Mark E. Neely, Jr. The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties
(New York: Oxford, 1991) , p. 161; and Trial, pp . 9-10 .
30
Trial, pp. 3-8.
31
Marvel , [p . ix]-x .
32 Davis, Ghosts, p. 183 .
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everything to break him down, if they cannot do it they try to assail his
private character." 33
Recent historians have condemned the trial. William Marvels stated that "Wirz was a dead man from the start." Ovid L. Futch wrote that
the trial was a "legal lynching of Wirz." Robert Scott Davis asserted
that the trial was "only a formality for a defendant facing the gallows at
the hands of a prejudiced court." Charles W. Sanders claimed "that the
entire proceeding was a sham-and a poorly executed sham at that." The
lawyer, Glen W. LaForce, agreed stating that "the trial of Henry Wirz
was worse than a mistake, worse even than a miscarriage of justice. The
trial of ... Wirz was a national disgrace. Vengeance, not justice, had been
served. " 34
The prosecution tried to implicate many leaders of the Confederacy in a conspiracy to murder prisoners by listing Jefferson Davis
and other leaders of the Confederacy as coconspirators. The court also
condemned "others whose names are unknown, [who] maliciously
and traitorously ... destroy[ed] the lives of a large number of Federal
prisoners." 35 No record of such a conspiracy has ever been uncovered,
and it was a false accusation created by the prosecution. The trial ended
on October 24. Wirz was found guilty and sentenced to hang.
Government agents came to see the condemned man in jail the
night before the execution and offered him a pardon to implicate Jefferson Davis in the crimes at Andersonville. Wirz rejected this bribe with
contempt as he told a companion. "These men have just offered me my
liberty if I will testify against Mr. Davis, and incriminate him with the
charges against the Andersonville Prison. I told them that I could not do
this, as I neither knew Mr. Davis personally, officially or socially, but
if they expected with the offer of my miserable life to purchase me to
treason and treachery to the South they had undervalued me." 36

33

Wirz "Diary," Oct. 4, 1865 , in New York Times, Nov. 15 , 1865 .
Marvel, p. 243 ; Futch, p. 120; Davis, Ghosts, p. 197; Sanders, While in the
Hands , p. 295; and Glen W. LaForce, "The Trial of Major Henry Wirz : a National
Disgrace ," The Army Lawyer (June 1988) , p. 10.
35
Trial, p. 807 .
36
Quoted by Richard Winder in James J. Williamson, Prison Life in the Old
Capitol and Reminiscences of the Civil War (West Orange, N.J.: np., 1911) , p. 139.
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On the day of his execution , November 10, 1865 , Wirz was concerned about his wife and children , and he sent a letter pleading that
they be helped financially. Henry Wirz was taken to the place of execution, and a long list of accusations were read to him as he stood on the
scaffold. When asked if he had any last words, Wirz replied, "No sir;
only that I am innocent, and will die like a man, my hopes being in
the future . I go before my God, the Almighty God, and he will judge
between me and you." Wirz fell when the trap door was released, but
the rope failed to break his neck , and he writhed in agony for twenty
minutes before he strangled to death. 37 At least, federal revenge ended
at that point, and there were no more executions for war crimes.
The tragedy of Andersonville still discredits the nation, and many
men in the Union and Confederacy must share the blame for the high
death rates in that prison, but Wirz was unfairly singled out for punishment. Henry Wirz was a flawed man who did his best to alleviate suffering and save lives at Andersonville , and he is no stain on the honor of
Swiss Americans .

- Albert Winkler, Brigham Young University

37

"The Execution of Wirz ," Boston Daily Advertiser, Nov. 11 , 1865 .
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Considering Swiss Neutrality in
World War One: Ideas,
Successes, and Failures
by Brian Wages

At first glance, the Fifteenth Century Swiss ascetic Niklaus von Flue
and George Washington have only their distinguished military service
in common. Yet they share something far more important to contemporary citizens of the United States and Switzerland. They were early
proponents of their respective nations' views on neutrality and vocal
advocates of avoiding foreign influences, alliances, and payments. 1 For
international observers, Swiss neutrality is a universal constant and the
nation is quickly approaching two hundred years of uninterrupted neutrality. The continued success of the Swiss people in preserving their
neutrality while faced by considerable challenges and fearsome foes, is
a model for many nations. The example provided by the Swiss during
the First World War on how to remain neutral despite popular inclinations and external pressures toward choosing one side over the other is
one that should be considered by peaceable nations today.
Surrounded by belligerents on every side, Switzerland was often
described as an island in the midst of a sea of war. This paper considers Swiss neutrality during World War One in three ways . The first is
the relative lack of serious examination of neutrality by English speaking researchers. Second, the Swiss created a sense of armed neutrality
and this idea was the foundation for their continued neutrality. Third,
the Swiss, despite being in the closest proximity to the principal warring parties and theaters of war, succeeded in preserving their neutrality
while the United States failed . The advantages of governmental organi-

1

James Murray Luck, A History of Switzerland: The First 100,000 Years: Before
the Beginnings to the Days of the Present (Palo Alto: Society for the Promotion of
Science and Scholarship , 1985), pp. 125-26.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol47/iss2/8

20

et al.: Full Issue
June 2011 SAHS Review

18

zation and the dangers of personality politics is a matter of grave import
to politicians and political scientists when considering how one nation
succeeded in maintaining neutrality.
The fact that Switzerland had preserved its neutrality for nearly a
hundred years before the outbreak of the war in 1914 and has continued
to preserve it for another hundred since is impressive. Legal scholar
Malborne Graham points out in his insightful survey of neutrality in the
Great War, "Neutrality ... was a temporary expedient, a frail structure
of compromise and concession erected in the midst of a very imperfect
society of nations." 2 While having national aspiration for centuries, the
Swiss in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries would have to approach the preservation of its neutrality differently than any other before them.
"The outbreak of the French Revolution and the invasion of Switzerland effectively nullified all treaties of assistance and mutual declarations of lasting friendship and neutrality that existed between the
French monarchy, other Powers and the Swiss Confederation.'' 3 Previous to and through the Napoleonic Era, nations seeking to remain
neutral had done so by relying on the good graces of the warring parties. "With the violation of treaties of guarantee such as protected the
... neutralized states ... of Europe came a realization that the theory of
neutralization did not stand the test of actual international conflict and
that in so far as the law of neutrality concerned neutralized states, its
provisions had been entirely overthrown.''4
At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, the victorious powers
clearly did not want the Swiss Confederation to remain a part of the
French realm, nor did they seek to divide it amongst themselves. The
plenipotentiaries in the peace negotiations pressed the cantons to again
be independent. 5 Given the historical and at times gradual development
of the Swiss conception of neutrality in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, it is hardly surprising that the Congress at Vienna sought to
guarantee the Confederation's sovereignty and neutrality. 6
2

Malborne W. Graham. "Neutrality in the World War." The American Journal of
International Law, 17 (Oct. 1923):4, p. 704 .
3
Luck , A History of Switzerland, p. 296 .
4
Graham, "Neutrality in the World War," p. 705.
5
Luck, A History of Switzerland, p. 322.
6
Ibid , pp. I 62-168 , 194-198 .
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Swiss Cavalry patrolling the frontier in 1917.
Courtesy: Library of Congress .

During the Congress of Vienna, the idea of enforced neutrality was
raised. The Duke of Dalberg, a representative of France, stated "It is
necessary to close this country entirely and to protect it completely from
war. Switzerland ought to be everybody's Fatherland." 7 The participants
7

Ibid, p. 328.
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of the congress sought to ensure, possibly by force if necessary, the
preservation of Swiss neutrality. Yet, it was the Swiss who began to develop the idea of armed neutrality through the Nineteenth Century. This
is not so unusual an idea considering the martial and mercenary nature
of many cantons throughout history. It finally found expression in the
Twentieth Century.
Annually, several hundred monographs relating to the First World
War are published in English and among this number are a few dealing
in some way to the Swiss. A survey of these works reveals that most
of the research focuses on the economic activity of Switzerland. Often
these works compare the First and Second World War economies and associated foreign relations. Another relatively frequent topic of research
is the impact of the Allied blockade on the Central Powers and whether
the Swiss played a role in circumventing it. Despite a number of charges
that the Swiss profited from the blockade, serious research reveals that
the longer the blockade continued the worse the Swiss economy became, most notably in foodstuffs. And in this context, it is also important to touch on the role the Allies played in relieving the crisis in food
supplies. 8
Perhaps the most common references to Switzerland during the
First World War center on its role as a meeting ground for peace overtures, propaganda ploys, intrigues by spies, and the ex-patriots who were
often political agitators . Of interest is the role of ambassadorial ministers in floating peace proposals between the warring parties, none of
which succeeded. Exciting stories of spies and other nefarious persons
occupy a number of these works. Finally, there were so many nationals
from the warring nations who sought refuge in the peaceful Alpine nation that they make good subject matter for research. "The neutrality of
no other country was made to serve the humane needs of all the belligerents as that of Switzerland. Monarchs, statesmen, philosophers, artists,
and socialists who could not approve of war, retired into Switzerland,
from all countries, where they found security and peace." 9 An interesting one of these is that "Swiss socialist leaders offered their country as

8
D. D. Driscoll, Anglo-Swiss Relations 1914-1918: With Special Reference to the
Allied Blockade of the Central Powers (London: University of London , 1968).
9
William Stanley Braithwaite. The Story of the Great War (New York: Frederick
A . Stokes Company, 1919), p. 107.
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a meeting-point for the conspirators of Europe, notably from Germany
and Russia" of which the Lenin "sealed train" is but the most prominent
example. 10 These two elements of the war relating to the Swiss are in
marked contrast to the general lack of interest in political and diplomatic neutrality of the state. However these events and people hold our
attention, they tended to relate less with the Swiss and more with the
extra-national resident. Location seems more of an afterthought or colorful background.
The relatively few studies in English of Swiss neutrality are in
contrast to the continued and extensive interest in other languages, particularly in German. Not surprisingly, some valuable published research
is being done in German. 11 At the same time the vast majority of references to Switzerland in English accounts of the war touch on front line
stretched from the Alps to the English Channel. 12 The relative lack of
serious treatment of Swiss neutrality in World War One creates a gap
in the scholarship of the period and overlooks the role played by this
neutral actor.
As the war opened, "The Federal Council decided, on 3 August
1914, that the situation was serious enough to warrant taking exceptional measures. It got the Federal Assembly to grant it full powers,
which were renewed on several occasions and did not end till long after
peace was declared." 13 Yet despite the ability for a wider latitude in decision making and perhaps taking the nation closer to one group of warring states or the other, the council continued to demure. Their political
organization led to a greater sense of community and reticence to drag
others into a devastating war even if popular sympathy favored one side
over another.
In retrospect, the mobilization of Swiss forces in 1914 may have
been the single greatest action to preserve its neutrality. As the historian
Edgar Bonjour expressed, "War-like activity can spur the defensive will,

° Christopher

1

Hughes. Switzerland (London: Ernst Benn Limited, 1975), p.

112.
11
Max Mittler. Der Weg zum Ersten Weltkrieg : Wie Neutral war die Schwiez?
(Zurich: Verlag Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 2003) .
12
Just one of many examples can be found in Jay Winter, The Great War: And the
Shaping of the 20th Century. (New York: Penguin Studio, 1996) , pp . 99,210 .
13
William Martin . Switzerland: From Roman Times to the Present (New York :
Praeger, 1971 ), p. 257.
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Ulrich Wille, Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army in World War I.
Courtesy: Wikipedia .

while inactivity, often felt as a denial of heroism, in the long run wears
men down." 14 It was this ideal that led the Federal Council to act and
act quickly. With nearly a century of ideological preparations, this act
of defensive will fell on the army. "The mobilization on August 3 of the
entire army of nearly 250,000 men went without a hitch." 15 By the time
the Germans began their march across Belgium, "The army [consisting] of 142,999 regulars and 91,809 Landwehr" with a "total, 231,808
men of all arms" were stationed along the frontier. 16 "The north-west of
Switzerland bordering France and Germany was the area most vulnerable to attack; and it was here on the line of the Jura from Basel to Les
Rangiers that three Swiss divisions were concentrated, with three more
held in reserve." 17
14
Edgar Bonjour. Swiss Neutrality: Its History and Meaning (London : George
Allen and Unwin, 1946), p. 108 .
15
Georg Thurer, Free and Swiss: the Story of Switzerland (Coral Gables , Florida:
University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 142.
16
Kelly Miller. Kelly Miller's History of the World War for Human Rights (New
York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 284.
17 Thurer, Free and Swiss, p. 144.
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Command of the Swiss army fell to the Prussian trained Ulrich
Wille. "In time of peace, there is no general officer in command of the
Swiss army, the highest rank being that of colonel. When mobilization
was decided upon, the Federal Council elected Colonel Ulrich Wille,
general and commander-in-chief." 18 A colorful figure, Wille commanded the army throughout the war, but not without controversy. In 1915
he advocated joining the Central Powers, a move that earned him the
enmity of many French-speaking Swiss. 19 Despite this event, his leadership preserved the difficult morale of the army whose central task was
waiting for frontier violations. In all, about one thousand incursions
occurred and "Four-fifths of the [those] violations of the Swiss frontiers
during the war were due to over-flights, and the powers made no direct
threat of invasion." 20
The fear of invasion drove Wille to move the bulk of his forces
to the region around the French and German borders. A contemporary
observer acknowledged the very real fear of invasion when he described
"Switzerland, like the other small states, was 'extremely anxious' as to
its position in the event of a European conflict. ... [but] so far is known,
no power contemplated violating the neutrality of Switzerland." 21 This
acknowledgement that no power actually planned on invasion reduces
the argument that armed neutrality deterred invasion.
The states surrounding the Alpine nation each took steps in the
case Swiss neutrality was violated by a hostile state (an example being when Italy stationed a number of troops along its northern border
in 1915 to forestall an invasion by Germany through Swiss territory). 22
However, none of these fears were realized. The evidence is that none
of the general staffs in each of the nations entertained any plans to cross
Swiss territory.
Even though there were no actual plans to invade Switzerland,
many believed an invasion could occur and contemporary events did
18
Henry J. Reilly. Why Preparedness: the Observations of an American Army
Officer in Europe, 1914-1915 (Chicago: Daughaday and Co., 1916), p. 147.
19
Hans Rudolf Fuhrer and Paul Meinrad Strassle. General Ulrich Wille: Vorbild
den Einen - Feindbild den Anderen (Zi.irich: Neue Zi.ircher Zeitung, 2003).
20
Thurer, Free and Swiss , p. 145.
21
Bernadotte E. Schmitt. The Coming of the War, 1914 . Volume lJ (London :
Scribners and Sons, 1930), p. 466 .
22
Pascal Trees. "Switzerland" in Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political,
Social, and Military History. Vol. 4 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), p. 1142.
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nothing to quell the fear. Indeed, Germany's "violation of the neutrality
of Belgium ... seemed to confirm these fears." 23 While many German
speaking Swiss sympathized with the Central Powers, they could not
easily dismiss the potential of a violation of their neutrality by the Germans.
With the entry of the Italians into the war in 1915, the Swiss again
feared a violation of their territorial integrity. Luigi Cadorna, Italian
field marshal and member of the general staff, in retrospect described
the possibility of invasion "at the time ... loomed large and weighed
continually like an incubus during the development of operations. They
made it necessary all the time to have in mind the possibility of Swiss
neutrality being violated and to consider measure to meet the eventuality, especially as, though remote, it would, had it materialized, have
placed the whole army suddenly in extreme danger." 24
If the Germans made no indication of invasion and the Italians had
no plans, what of the French armies? Early on in the war, the American attache in Zurich, supported the evidence that there were few indications of invasion by another power. He said, "the Germans did not
seem to feel any particular apprehension of French invasion through
Switzerland." 25 Accordingly, in a memorandum by the German Headquarters staff, "In the South, Switzerland forms an extremely solid
bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality
against France, and thus protecting our flank." 26 It is interesting to note
that the Swiss appeared to fear more an invasion from Italy or France,
while the German army thought this was unlikely. The British military
attache, Colonel Delme-Radcliffe, in Bern correctly assessed the situation when he stated, "the existing Swiss fortifications are directed exclusively against France and Italy." 27
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(Oxford: Cl arendon Press, 1952) , p. 344.
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27
Luigi Albertini . The Origins of the War of 1914 (London: Oxford University
Press , 1957),p.685.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2011

27

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 47 [2011], No. 2, Art. 8
Considering Swiss Neutrality in World War One

25

The idea of armed neutrality and its place in descriptions of the
war have led to the impression that it alone is the reason for Switzerland's success in preserving its neutrality. As observed in post-World
War Two, "humanitarian activities could help to create a favorable image of Switzerland in the world, but reliable security could not be gained
in this way." 28 The authors of this treatise go on to argue that neutrality
cannot be (and during World War One was not) preserved only by the
good graces of the belligerents. The Swiss found an alternative and it
was to create the neutrality and enforce it themselves .
However, this idea of armed neutrality as the only savior of the nation fails to see other factors that impacted the nation as it remained an
island surrounded by militant nations . Stanley Knight, writing shortly
after the war began, said of Switzerland, "Because of her geographical
position, her military importance is out of all proportion to the extent
of her territory or the strength of her army." 29 The real preserver of national neutrality may actually have been related to "war aims."
Any discussion of war aims is inherently difficult and controversial. This is especially true as historians consider documents and evidence not available to the principal actors at the time. These contemporaries were left to react to the intelligence available and often made
decisions based on incomplete or inaccurate sources. Many historians
stated that armed neutrality as the foundation for its success is indicative only of the information under which these assumptions were made.
However, the fact that few, if any, plans for a violation of Swiss neutrality even existed seems to have little impact on the preservation of the
idea.
As a concluding analysis of the idea of armed neutrality, Clausewitz's assertion on the correlation between war and diplomacy may
have limited application in those cases like that of Switzerland. It could
be argued that no war was waged against Switzerland because of a success in diplomatic efforts. Yet the evidence seems to be lacking for such
an argument. The interplay between the belligerent nations and Switzerland provided a balance in what they each wanted to gain and the Swiss
28
Rolf Kieser and Kurt R. Spillmann . The New Switzerland: Problems and
Policies (Palo Alto: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1996), p.

61.
29
W. Stanley Macbean Knight. The History of the Great European War: Its
Causes and Effects (London: Caxton Pub ., 1914), p. 159 .
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people who wished to preserve their neutrality. For the parties involved,
there would have been little advantage to invasion. This is also true of
the Swiss, they saw little diplomatic advantage to choosing one side
or the other. Therefore the wisdom of the Swiss, more than their army,
enabled their continued neutrality.
An overriding success of neutrality may have lay more in the
personalities and individual choices of the belligerent powers. While
the Swiss feared an invasion and made preparations to defend against
it, there are few indications from either side that any of them anticipated a large scale violation of Swiss neutrality. This is in marked
contrast to the Second World War, when the German general staff created Operation Tannenbaum that was specifically aimed at occupying
and pacifying Switzerland. These specific plans were created at the
behest of Adolf Hitler and are in marked contrast to the civilian and
military leaders twenty five years earlier who did not anticipate such
a move .
With the considerable number of neutral nations when the First
World War began, it is intriguing to note how that number decreased
year by year as the war unfolded. The success of Swiss neutrality in
comparison to the United States failure may be an indication of political
organization and the power of personality in leading nations into war.
If this is the case, the success of neutrality in any era has considerably
less to do with proximity, or even popular sympathy.
When comparing the personalities
of the presidents of each nation, there are
similarities and differences. Arthur Hoffmann, president of Switzerland when the
war began, energetically gave extensive
powers to Wille to defend the nation and
preserve neutrality. Woodrow Wilson,
an early advocate of peace in Europe,
shared the neutral stance of the Swiss
for much of the first two years of war.
Indeed, "Wilson's peace note of DecemArthur Hoffmann,
President of Swiss
ber 18 to all the belligerents. This peace
effort of Wilson was supported by [the]
Confederation, 1914.
Courtesy: Swiss Federal Council.
Swiss" government, but ultimately came
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2011

29

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 47 [2011], No. 2, Art. 8
Considering Swiss Neutrality in World War One

27

to nothing. 30 However, two events illustrate how different the two men
were in preserving, or failing to preserve their respective nation's neutrality.
In 1917, Arthur Hoffmann, then a member of the federal council,
was involved with an associate, Robert Grimm, who made overtures to
the Russian government that "Germany would be interested in a peace
agreement." 3 1 The event reveals Hoffmann's attempt to shorten the war
and his own leanings toward a victory for the Central Powers. His resignation was swift and helped to defuse the situation. It also revealed the
overriding opinions of the Swiss. Neutrality, despite personal feeling,
was the overriding concern.
Woodrow Wilson, once a passionate advocate for American neutrality, faced a similar challenge with the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. While the events leading to the American
declaration of war are complex, the president's role is hard to minimize.
He seems to have accepted the interesting portend for the future by
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu in 1904. The Americans "have inherited the role,
which, until recently, Britain played in the world" .32 This was a perception of America that in the course of World War One they were to accept
and become a bastion of democracy. It is also a view that would extend
well beyond the early years of the twentieth century.
When it is considered how many were involved in the fighting
around the world during World War One, the mere fact that Switzerland
maintained its neutrality throughout the conflagration is a commendable
success. While many other nations began the war with declarations of
neutrality, the Swiss did not fall into the traps others did . They did this
despite being completely surrounded. Yet there remains a relative dearth
of English research on the topic. This can be rectified with an increased
awareness of the benefits to be gained by such a scholarly endeavor.
The idea of armed neutrality, while integral in its day, was not the only
reason the Swiss succeeded. There are many other factors involved, an
understanding of which can provide a template for preserving peace
30

Bernadotte E. Schmitt. The World in the Crucible: 1914-1919 (New York :
Harper and Row, 1984) , p. 464.
31
James Murray Luck, ed . Modern Switzerland. (Palo Alto: Society for the
Promotion of Science and Scholarship , 1978), p. 422.
32 Leroy-Beaulieu , Paul. Les Etats-Unis au XXe siecle. (Paris, 1904), xxii , 4 I 623.
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and neutrality even today. A primary factor is to avoid the power of personality in driving nations toward conflict in the first place. The Swiss
succeeded for many reasons, not the least of which was governmental
organization and diffusion of power amongst many personalities rather
than a few or even one. Such considerations can create a more peaceful world. The application of such ideas can mark the start of the third
hundred years of Swiss neutrality.
- Brian Wages, Brigham Young University
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Heidi and Seek:
Cases of Espionage and Covert
Operation in Switzerland,

1795-1995
by Brian Champion

When, exactly, Switzerland became a hub for intelligence gathering
and covert operations has been lost to the mists of time . Despite centuries of implicit and declared transnational neutrality, Switzerland, by the
cruel ironies of geographic fate, couldn't help being at the confluence of
the intelligence realpolitik in Europe and, later, in the world. This article
seeks to illustrate through selected examples--from the early nineteenth
to the twentieth centuries--facets of the history of the foreign use of
Switzerland and the Swiss neutrality ideal in the tectonic power politics of international intrigue. Spying and associated covert operations
in Switzerland-then as now-are illegal, of course, as they are in all
countries. But the Swiss history of clandestine or subrepitious actions
is rich and seldom acknowledged, and this article intends to illumine
selected clandestine cases which illustrate how Switzerland accommodates covert enterprise.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for example,
the British ambassador to Bern, William Wickham, used diplomatic
cover to create and manage Secret Service operations intended to support French aristocrats under threat of assassination or summary execution. Wickham was sent to Switzerland to investigate the credibility
of French royalists' claims of strengths and support during the French
Revolution; French royalty financed the operation, dubbed Agence
Fran9aise, but it was intellectually controlled and managed by the British Secret Service. Wickham 's Swiss contact was an expatriate French
general, Charles Gregan Craufurd, who, from his villa in Vienna, had
been recruiting foreign mercenaries to fight on the royalists ' behalf. Both
29
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Wickham and Craufurd recruited Swiss and foreign military talent, and
in so doing, created a large number of British intelligence agents who
reported through ersatz military channels on the socio-military developments, and which were of considerable interest to the British Foreign
Office in London. These developments created, in the words of British
historian Elizabeth Sparrow, "a unified Franco/British continental system of espionage" which had its headquarters in Vaud canton. 1
Through the winter of 1795-96, Wickham relocated to Lausanne
where he directed Francis Drake, the Crown's representative in Milan
and Genoa, to create "agencies" similar to those he had created in Switzerland. Drake did, but Napoleon's successful Italian campaign forced
Drake to flee to Venice and his agents were left to their own devices;
some fled to the south of France while others made their way to Vaud
and were incorporated into Wickham's Swiss agency. Through these
agents, Wickham controlled royalist cells in southern France and even
some located in the French interior. 2
The French royalist strategy of peaceful electoral reform of the
anti-monarchists devolved into legislative gridlock, and only military
action was considered the sole remedy to political inertia; in short,
Wickham's agents and their associates in Paris were soon ratted out ,
induced by lures of cash for information, and the British intelligence effort in Switzerland was quickly penetrated, also compromised by some
of the mercenaries recruited to do its bidding. As Sparrow notes, "The
immediate consequences were to force the breaking of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Switzerland; the rupture of peace negotiations at Lille; the end of the Swiss Agency [the Foreign Office's
spy organization], and most important for this discussion, the end of
attempts to promote counter-revolution by the electoral process." 3
In the geopolitics of European revolution and counterrevolution ,
this (temporary) failure of the British covert efforts, when discovered,
accelerated French efforts to substantiate monarchy throughout the
continent; even while temporary setbacks were encountered, they none-

1
Elizabeth Sparrow, "The Swiss and Swabian Agencies, 1795-1801," The Historical Journal 35(4): pp. 861-84. See also Elizabeth Sparrow, Secret Service : British
Agents in France, 1792-1815 (Suffolk: The Boydell Press , 1999).
2
Ibid, p. 865.
3
Ibid, p. 868.
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theless rebounded generally (and in Switzerland particularly) until the
counterrevolutionary movement had faded . But as Sparrow also notes ,
the British role in using various forms of cover in Swiss territory merely
illustrates cases in the modern use of Switzerland as the confluence of
information and influence. Indeed, Sparrow correctly asserts that it is
important to know "[t]he political significance of Anglo-French 'agencies', which were paid-and controlled-by the British government between 1795 and 1801 ... The principal purpose of formal [espionage]
agencies [in Switzerland] was to sanction British counterrevolutionary
activities within France, which would have been seen by the French as
blatant interference in the internal affairs of their nation. The agencies
also provided an umbrella for British attempts to coordinate all the antirevolutionary groups [on the continent], whether true royalists or not.
.. . They also permitted many agents to be left unaware of, or even to
repudiate, British control, while still accepting British money." 4
The British weren't the only ones who sought for and established
complicity for covert programs among native Swiss. In the late eighteenth century, pre-revolutionary pro-tsarist Russian agents throughout
Europe sought information on, and sometimes lethally dispatched, antitsarist elements under the sway of continental anti-tsarist republican
political sentiments. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Russian
government department which monitored political crimes internally
was called the Okhrannye Otdeellenii (commonly abbreviated to just
Okhrannye) but to have a respectable foreign presence, the Okhrannye
created the Foreign Agency, based in Russia's Paris embassy, and while
content to surveil dissident Russians, it also had to battle the Department of Police agents also sent abroad for dominance in the business of
feeding the government intelligence. In 1907, for example, Okhrannye
intercepted a communication intended for the Department of Police in
St Petersburg which confirmed Swiss complicity in the covert spying of
Russian exiles in Switzerland: "From the letter of our envoy to the Swiss
Republic, I see, among other things, that a code for secret messages has
been established between the Department of Police and Hodier [head of
the Swiss Federal Police] ... " 5

4
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The role and utility of the so-called "externals" can be simply explained: "Unlike internals, all of whom were Russian, no detectives in
the external agency were Russian. They were all native to the country
in which they habitually worked-an obvious requirement to avoid attracting suspicion and to facilitate contacts with non-Russians for the
purpose of acquiring information." 6
As historian Richard J Johnson reports, the failure of some Swiss
agents to blend into the innocuous background of cantons and Swiss
cities limited their utility in covert operations. "Interestingly, one [external] agent (the Swiss detective Rigault) was dismissed because his
obesity attracted too much public attention." 7 However, so great was the
interest in the activities and disposition of Russian exiles that Okhrana
operatives concentrated their attentions on the expatriate communities in
Paris, London and Berlin; other colonies of Russian ex pats were monitored by local police, and in Geneva, the Okhrana had very specialized
assistance: "In Switzerland, an important center of emigre activity, the
internal agency [Okhrana] was depended on heavily for information . In
this task it had the support of three Russophile Geneva policemen [later
identified by their last names: Depasse!, Deleamon, and Bocque] who
were on the Agency [Okhrana] payroll to pass on whatever information came to them at the Geneva police office, and secondly to provide
a check on information sent directly from Geneva police officials to
the head of the Foreign Agency." 8 In addition to the three cops, it was
also noted that at least one Swiss postal worker, a man named Mercier,
provided mail to and from interesting Swiss correspondents which the
Okhrana then read. 9
The effect of all this covert observation was that at some point the
pro-tsarists spies sent their information to Russian ambassadors, who
then conveyed to their host governments a very likely exaggerated view
of the threat these emigres posed to the stability of the host countries.
As a result, the local police would periodically arrest individuals identified solely by Okhrana as a 'threat' and they would be incarcerated; one
such dragnet caught a young Russian student who lamented in a let6
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ter to friends that Switzerland had become enormously less friendly to
revolutionaries and that he would rather live in Belgium where he could
peaceably pursue his studies. 10
In another example of the usefulness of Swiss neutrality to covert
operations, the start of World War I put Italy with the alliance but they
ultimately switched sides. This caused some difficulties for the Italians
and for the Vatican secret service which looked for a more accommodating locale from which to collect information. "When Italy entered the
war [in 1915], Berlin and Vienna closed their embassies in the Eternal
City and recalled their diplomats . The German and Austrian embassies
to the Holy See relocated to Lugano, Switzerland, where they tried to
maintain long-distance relations with the Vatican. Franz von Stockhammern [a German diplomat at the Rome embassyl 1] also moved his espionage operations to Switzerland, where, from the security of neutral
territory, he organized intelligence networks inside Italy." 12
Not only was Swiss territory used by the war's belligerents for
espionage, it was also useful for other purposes: "Switzerland was a fertile field for Italian intelligence operations against the Papacy in large
part because Italian military intelligence had convinced itself that the
Alpine confederation was the center of a clandestine committee that
secretly controlled the pope and determined the policies of the Vatican.
The Italians believed that this shadowy group was directed by a triumvirate made of the papal delegate to Switzerland, the Father General of
the Jesuits, who had relocated the headquarters of the famous religious
order to Switzerland for the duration of the war, and (most improbably)
the bishop of Coire, a small diocese in the Romansche region of Switzerland . Through the war, SIM [Italian intelligence] received reports
that the Papacy's major diplomatic initiatives, particularly plans in 1917
to mediate a negotiated settlement of the war, were contrived or at least
approved by this secret directorate, which, in turn, had clandestine connections to Berlin and Vienna." 13
While such an idea might have been popular with anti-Catholics,
as Vatican historian David Alvarez remarks, "The idea was, of course,
10
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preposterous, as was pointed out by the British ambassador to the Holy
See, who, noting the propensity ofltalian military intelligence to collect
information with 'much industry, but less discrimination', scoffed at the
very notion of a secret authority in Switzerland." 14
The Italians were not easily dissuaded on the issue of putative
Vatican power, and continued to rummage through the Holy See 's diplomatic pouches, though technically immune, in search of papal missives. To thwart such methods, the episcopal office in Caire resorted to
the time-tested vector of couriers to send important papers from Switzerland to the Vatican, and when that proved inconvenient, relied on
the couriers of other countries, "who, as a courtesy to the Holy Father,
opened their [own] diplomatic bags for the buff envelopes sealed with
wax impressions of the keys of St Peter." 15
World War I was an event of such great geostrategic importance
to the British empire that it spawned and perpetuated a number of British intelligence agencies, one of which went on to become MI6 or the
British Secret Service. But irrespective of the agency, Switzerland was
the preferred center of anti-Teutonic covert operations. "Early in the
War, [Mansfield Smith] Cumming [head of several military intelligence
units] established an agent network in Switzerland run by Lieutenant
LG Campbell from the French frontier town of Annemasse, near Geneva. [But two other 'agencies' were started.] The first such agency was
created by Colonel George Pollitt, a former chemist with a doctorate
in chemistry from Basie University, who was considered by virtue of
his education to be an ideal insert into the Swiss espionage circus. In
1915, the British vice consul in Zurich, Arthur Abbot, directed Pollitt
and gave him his orders for the initial surveillance of German militaryindustrial preparations .... As well as sending Pollitt to Zurich in 1915 ,
Wallinger also gained Kirke 's approval to 'try and work Geneva'. Wallinger handed over the Genevan 'show' and general control of his Swiss
operations to his elder brother Captain (later Major Sir) John Wallinger
of the Indian Police." 16
British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew also points out
that the British chemical company Bruner Mand was imposed upon
14
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by British intelligence to provide operatives with front company cover
who could enter various European cities, including Swiss, seeking and
extracting information while using their corporate connections to hide
their espionage work: "In March [1915] [Walter] Kirke [head of a unit
of British military intelligence] persuaded Brunner Mond to send another of their employees, EB Harran, on a mission to Switzerland which
would provide cover for espionage. Harran took over the Romulus/
Schmidt network from Pollitt and by early June was receiving [in Geneva] regular reports from [British operatives] in Mannheim, Nuremburg,
Stuttgart, Bremen and Frankfurt." 17
The British Geneva operation suffered from inconsistent performance and, coupled with idiosyncratic personalities , produced little
effective intelligence. By November, the agent system had been penetrated and "many of Cummings agents in Switzerland were arrested",
effectively ending that part of the intelligence mission. 18
An interesting sidelight to Switzerland's role in world politics after The Great War is that President Woodrow Wilson initially wanted
peace talks to occur in Switzerland: "Prodded by [Wilson's friend and
presidential advisor Edward M] House, Wilson gave the matter a few
moment's thought and opted for Lausanne. But by then Switzerland
looked less and less secure. Lenin's departure [a mere] eighteen months
before had not silenced the Swiss revolutionary workers' movement,
and a wave of protests and police countermeasures disturbed the neutral calm. 'On second thought,' Wilson penned, 'it occurs to me that
Versailles may be the best place for the peace conference, where friendly influences and authorities are in control, rather than in Switzerland
which is saturated with every poisonous element and open to every hostile influence in Europe."' 19
The peace talks, of course, transpired at Versailles and the kernel
of expanded international intrigue was planted and gestated there. In
1917, America had declared war on Germany and entered the European
theater, and a young diplomat named Allen Dulles needed to personally
and professionally relocate from Vienna-as one of the belligerents-

17
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to neutral Bern. There he arranged residential housing at the Bellevue
Palace Hotel. "From the enormous, high-ceilinged lobby to the private
suites with Louis XV furnishings, everything whispered grand luxe
and earthly serenity. To be sure, beneath the surface were tensions and
intrigue; this was where all the 'secret' agents-some of them quite
well known to each other-found it convenient to stay over. 'Enemies
bumped into one another in the elevator, found themselves at the same
desk talking to the concierge, ate in the same dining room' recalled
one of Allen [Dulles'] colleagues. 'Frequently the enemies had been
acquaintances or even friends in past years, now they looked through
each other at meeting and did their best to pretend the other was notexistent' ." 20
It turns out that Allen Dulles, future Director of Central Intelligence, would have quite an experience in Switzerland. The day of
his arrival, Easter Sunday 1917, while sorting through his personal
effects at the US consulate in Bern, a low-level clerk handed him the
telephone as he was the ranking diplomat in the building that day. On
the other end was a young radical Russian, just now departing Bern,
but wishing to speak with an American representative. Dulles had a
tennis game planned with a young Swiss co-ed he'd met in college
and told the caller he should come to the office the next day. Alas, the
caller said, Monday would be too late, and the conversation ended.
Allen Dulles, who would become one the chief anti-Soviet Cold Warriors thirty years later, had as his first official duties in the Swiss city
speaking to Vladimir Lenin, who left on a sealed train back to Russia
to overthrow the czar. 2 1
One of the more obvious aspects of Swiss clandestine work is in
the Swiss banking system. Though not state-sponsored, the degree of
covertness implicit in confidential but not-yet digital banking transactions meant that nondescript couriers, with attache cases loaded with
money or negotiable securities or even with information of a priceless
nature, would transit various of Europe's cities in great anonymity to
conclude confidential business with a variety of clients. So valuable
became this element of Swiss banking that the industry developed a
20
Hugh R Wilson, The Education of a Diplomat (New York: Longman's Green,
I938), pp . 209-10, quoted in Grose, p 28.
21
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cadre of professional couriers whose expertise at avoiding Customs
inspectors or other governmental attempts at interdiction equaled or
surpassed those of the intelligence services of recognized states. In
fact, as business historian TR Fehrenbach points out, because of Swiss
expertise in unobtrusive operations, "[a]cross Europe the use of nominees [anonymous persons who act for another] and front companies
came into vogue" .22 And until airport security measures made it prohibitive, Swiss banking couriers were known to jet around the Middle
East with as much as 20 kilograms of gold underneath their belts. 23
Economist RT Naylor recounts, and also bibliographically documents,
cases where Geneva's Banque de Credit Internationale moved money
to and from Israel (among other places) and was used in the 1970s as
Mossad's European paymaster. 24
One of the best sources for an encyclopedic survey of Swiss intelligence and covert operations which affected Swiss national policy during Hitlerite Europe is Pierre Braunschweig's Secret Channel to Berlin:
The Masson-Schellenberg Connection and Swiss Intelligence in World
War ll. 25 Roger Masson was the head of Swiss war-time intelligence and
Walter Schellenberg was Hitler's intelligence czar; their contacts and
communications, through the Nazi's thrusts and the Swiss parries, are
very revealing about clandestine operations from the 1930s to beyond
V-E Day. Typical of the kinds of counterintelligence operations Masson
was supervising is a comment made in a 1941 memo to the Chief of the
Swiss General Staff. The memo's comment illustrates the components
of the information net useful to Swiss intelligence: "The contacts with
the various federal and cantonal authorities, which had gained an insight into certain foreign plans and intentions or were able to shed light
on certain incidents, were satisfactory in every respect; we were grateful for their cooperation. The contacts with the Swiss National Bank and
the Department of Economy and its Commerce Section were particular-
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ly valuable, and so were the contacts with the Federal Office of Heath,
with which we exchanged some information, and the Federal Office of
Veterinary Science." 26
Not only did government agents see Switzerland as innocuous
cover, but corporate spies also found Swiss centrality useful to uncovering commercial secrets. In one particular example illustrative of the
sorts of escapades frequently undertaken, a staff member at Geneva's
Union des Banques Suisse (UBS), known only as Herr Stroehlin, was
apparently the target of blackmail by French intelligence agencies looking for a way to penetrate the bank for information on American corporate clients. French agents planted a stolen Alfa Romero vehicle in his
home on the French side of the Swiss border and then called the police;
the hapless man was at a loss to explain the presence of the contraband.
Quickly grasping what the French authorities were after, Stroehlin fingered another banker, known as Herr Ralf, who might be able to provide
the desired information. It was agreed that the two bankers would rendezvous with the French agents at the Hotel Sheraton in Zurich and, over
drinks, discuss the remuneration for obtaining what the French covert
operatives wanted. The French refused to receive the purloined information in Switzerland, and the bankers didn't want to leave Switzerland
with it, so the two parties agreed to swap the information for twenty
thousand Swiss francs at the train station in Basel. At the designated
time, Stroehlin and Ralf appeared with a valise and acknowledged the
two French agents loafing on the station platform; meeting, the quartet
sauntered over to a kiosk. "They ordered beers . Suddenly a swarm of
thirty Swiss police officers arrived. The two French agents were clearly
shaken but they soon realized they'd been set up. Herr Ralf, it appeared,
was not a corrupt banker. Indeed, he was none other than Ralf Elsner,
the chief of security at UBS". The French men were arrested, a situation which caused great embarrassment for the French government,
who had sent their agents into Switzerland with no official exculpatory
documents and with only the twenty thousand francs in cash; a few days
later, "the Swiss notified senior French officials of their agents' arrest.
The Swiss kept the funds." 27
26
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A German industrial spy, Karl Heinrich Stohlze, used the IBM
research lab in Zurich as his corporate espionage target. This lab had
been working to make semiconductors more efficient at warmer temperatures: "For two months, Stohlze stayed in Zurich, where his mission was to observe the workings of the facility, follow and track its
employees, and establish a plan for tapping into the facility's secrets
when orders were given to do so" . Through the use of native Germans
employed at the lab, and through bribing other Swiss workers, Stohlze
obtained proprietary IBM data. 28
The Israelis also used Switzerland for significant industrial espionage. A small unit of the Israeli Defense Ministry, most commonly
known by the acronym of is Hebrew name, LAKAM (Scientific Liaison Bureau) , and which was heavily involved in the only espionage
prosecution of an American convicted of spying for Israel, the Jonathan
Pollard case, had great success in industrial espionage; but as notorious was the Pollard case, its most significant caper was not wrought
on American but on Swiss soil. Despite Israeli success in the 1967
Six-Day War, Israel recognized a great need for an advanced fighter
jet; but they also recognized they couldn't afford to buy new ones
on the open fighter jet market. It was determined that if Israel could
somehow obtain plans or blueprints of someone else's fighter, Israel
could more economically build one at home. Acknowledging its technological deficit, LAKAM agents fanned out across the industrialized
world. As industrial espionage historian Peter Schweizer characterizes
it, "its reach is enormous. LAKAM agents have operated in the United
States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Switzerland, and
Sweden. They have stolen secrets worth hundreds of millions, perhaps
billions, of dollars ." 29 In time, a disgruntled Swiss engineer, Alfred
Frauenknecht, who was employed at the factory which built the latest version of the French Mirage jet, met an Israeli defense attache
assigned to Israel's Paris embassy. Though not Jewish, Frauenknecht
had great sympathy for Israel and after several meetings with the attache, Frauenknecht agreed to become a LAKAM agent specifically
charged with getting the Mirage's blueprints. Working with a nephew
who also worked in the Dassault, the Mirage's manufacturer's Swiss
28
29
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supply chain, Frauenknecht ultimately delivered several thousand documents to his LAKAM handler. The thoroughness of Frauenknecht's
vacuuming of Swiss documents ultimately led company security officials to become suspicious and Frauenknecht was eventually arrested
and convicted. He only spent a year in prison--and, in fact, was on hand
in Israel for the Kfir fighter jet's inaugural test flight. 30
In the mid-1970s, the post-Vietnam Cold War took a slightly different tilt, pitting the US and other western powers against so-called
"rogue states" instead of against the usual suspects (the Soviet Union
and its proxies), and targeted countries which seemed to choose to ignore the conventions of international society in favor of locally-popular yet morally-dubious policies. Two such targeted states were Libya
and Uganda-Libya, and its leader Muammar Qaddafi, for its defiance
of the UN ,31 and Uganda, for its expulsion of thousands of ethnic south
Asians via forced deportations, ordered by its hyperparanoid leader Idi
Amin. To find out what was going on in these countries, the Central
Intelligence Agency outsourced some of its clandestine intelligence
collection to the Israelis (and to other surrogates); one such operation,
known in the literature by the internal CIA code name KKMOUNTAIN, utilized the Israeli intelligence expertise of the Mossad, who
created an ingenious intelligence operation that relied on Switzerland
for its success.
It seems that Amin was on a state visit to Libya in 1975 when
Qaddafi flew Amin home in his then-state-of-the-art Gulfstream II business jet. Qaddafi had purchased the aircraft from a Zurich-based aviation company, Zimex, whose owner, Hans Zeigler was, unbenownst to
Qaddaffi (or to almost anyone else), a Mossad agent, and had groomed
Zimex in Zurich to be a Mossad front at the disposal of the Israeli government. Zeigler sold Qaddafi the bizjet and provided a short-term "wet
lease", the aviation industry term for also providing flight crew, to man
the plane and to fly it anywhere the Libyan dictator wanted to go. Every time Qaddafi flew the GII, it was crewed by Zimex personnel, all
of whom, it turns out, were also Mossad operatives. In addition to the

30
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wet lease, Zimex also sold the Libyan dictator a state-of-the-art sound
system to adequately complement the plane's sumptuous interior, complete with top-of-the-line speakers, headphones and an elaborate panel
of controls for the then-popular music cassettes and eight tracks of the
day. Unbeknownst to Qaddafi, when Zimex provided a sound-listening
system, it also covertly embedded among the electronics microphones
and recording devices so that all conversations on the plane-Qaddafi's
and others'--were recorded by the Zimex crew, providing Zimex's Israeli sponsor with a veritable treasure-trove of rare intelligence from an
unsuspecting Arab leader.
The Ugandan dictator Amin was quite taken with the Libyan jet's
performance and opulence and wanted one for himself. Qaddafi put
Amin in touch with Zeigler in Zurich, who contacted an American by
the name of James Wilmot, chairman and co-founder of Page Airways,
who delivered to Amin his own decadent Gulfstream II jet. According
to published reports, Amin and Wilmot became close personal friends,
Wilmot spending time in Kampala as Amin 's presidential guest, which
gave Wilmot the opportunity to sell more aircraft to Amin. Not long after, Amin determined that his air force needed transport planes, which
Page conveniently sold to Amin through Zimex . From its base in Zurich, Zimex also sold Amin a Boeing 707 cargo plane , and the next
year Zeigler induced Amin to lease another plane; all these aircraft
were contractually wet-leased, crewed by Mossad and by Americans
working for a variety of CIA aviation-based front companies, and were
all rigged to collect and record intelligence emanating from Ugandan
sources. Flights from Zurich and other European cities to and from
Uganda exported Ugandan cash crops like coffee and cocoa, while
smuggled arms among consumer goods made the return trips profitable. Aside from the airborne conversations recorded and delivered to
espionage managers, the aircraft were occasionally flown into areas not
usually visited by westerners, due to the clandestine nature of supplying the regional rebel armies and insurrectionist groups Amin supported. Zimex and its Zurich-based operatives made it a watershed Israeli
and American intelligence.32
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Zurich has also been a center for the clandestine transfer of assets.
The western-assisted mujahedeen who fought against the Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s used European and Swiss locales
as transfer points for commodities that had cash-value in Afghanistan;
initially, opium and heroin were products with enormous covert barter
capabilities, but as the Taliban in Afghanistan increased the territory
under their theocratic control they also engaged in opium suppression
as part of their savage interpretation of Islamic law, and "encouraged"
Afghan farmers to grow other cash crops. Gold, watches, counterfeit
money and other contraband were useful to the Taliban, and trafficking in those commodities were approved substitutes for heroin. Those
smuggling contraband initially relied on secret Turkish routes, but enforcement of anti-smuggling laws in NATO-partner Turkey meant the
Afghan smugglers needed another avenue to markets; thus emerged
the Bulgarian connection. When black marketers in Sofia and other
ports had cash that need to be safely converted into bank accounts ,
the undercover entrepreneurs looked north-west to Switzerland for the
protection of Swiss banking laws. According to Naylor, "In Sofia, the
[smuggler's] money was taken to a special warehouse owned by and
import-export company controlled by Bulgarian intelligence. Bulgarian officials took a modest $1 to $3 per $1000, and the remainder was
turned over to couriers. Escorted to the airport by Bulgarian police, the
couriers winged their way to Zurich airport, either turning the money
over to other couriers sent by the Swiss banks or depositing it directly
in branches of those same backs kept inside the transit area [of the airport]. The Bulgarian nexus also worked in reverse: money in the Swiss
banks was used to buy gold. Armoured [sic] cars conveyed the gold to
Zurich airport. Couriers with ten to twenty kilograms strapped around
their bodies flew to Sofia. The Bulgarian police met and accompanied
them to the safe house. The gold was weighed, the Bulgarians getting
$60 per kilogram, then stuffed under false floors of buses carrying back
to Istanbul their share of the 60 to 100 tons of gold (worth [then] more
than $1 billion) annually smuggled via Bulgaria into Turkey [and back
to the Taliban] ." 33
The Swiss can be maddeningly polite in the midst of a covert
operation. For example, the notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal ,
33

Naylor, p. 75.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2011

45

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 47 [2011], No. 2, Art. 8
Heidi and Seek

43

widely known in counterterrorism circles as a bloodthirsty and frequent
attacker of innocent civilians, funded his Baghdad-based, then Damascus-based, organization with huge contributions from wealthy Arabs. In
the early 1980s, a known associate of Abu Nidal's, a rumpled, unkempt
but gregarious associate named Abd Al-Rahman Isa , was sent from
Syria to Geneva to deposit cash in one of Abu Nidal's Swiss bank accounts. The disheveled Isa is reported to have landed at Geneva airport
carrying a suitcase burdened by $5 million in cash; asked by a Swiss
Customs agent if he had anything to declare, Isa calmly replied that he
had $5 million cash in his suitcase, which, the Customs agent quickly
confirmed . As terrorism scholar Patrick Seal recounts, "Respectfully,
the customs officer detailed one of his colleagues to escort Isa to the
bank of his choice" .34
In a pattern used by contemporary Arab terrorists like Al Qaeda,
Abu Nidal depended heavily on the Swiss to enable some of his operations: "Switzerland is important to Abu Nidal because much of his
money is deposited there and he is anxious to protect it. He needs privileges in Switzerland, residence permits, visas, the freedom to move
in and out for himself and key members of his organization. He does
his utmost to conciliate the Swiss authorities, frequently sending his
representatives, Atif Hammuda, of the Finance Directorate [of Nidal's
organization] and Ali al-Farrah, of the Intelligence Directorate, to negotiate with the Swiss. But when he feels the dialogue [sic] is flagging,
he does not hesitate to use forceful measure. In 1988-89, when some
of his international financial dealings were revealed (following the defection to the West of Dirar Abd al-Fattah al-Silwani, manager of his
trading enterprise in East Berlin), he feared that Switzerland might be
persuaded to freeze his accounts there. He immediately sent a message
to Swiss intelligence threatening havoc at the Zurich airport and, in
a characteristic preemptive strike, kidnapped two Swiss delegates of
the International Red Cross at Sidon [Lebanon] in October 1989. When
the crisis passed, the delegates were released." 35 Abu Nidal also had a
Zurich-based trading company which provided revenue and cover for
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many of Abu Nidal 's attacks, the head of which, in 1987, was executed
as a CIA and Mossad spy. 36
In the 1980s, Switzerland was a geographically-central location
for covert operations thousands of miles away. Iranian, Iraqi, Saudi,
Russian, American, and Israeli intelligence agencies (among many
other countries) used Swiss cities and airports as the preferred site for
clandestine acquisitions. Several documented cases reveal how Saddam
Hussein used Swiss centrality are illustrative of the scope and depth of
Swiss-based secret mission.
To contextualize, Iran's 1979 revolution removed the pro-western
Shah and installed a very independent Shia caliphate in Tehran. Sunni
Saddam Hussein, thinking Shia Iran was otherwise distracted, chose to
attack Iran, seeking greater territory from which Iraq could extract more
oil and have additional oil terminals for international shipping. Because
of the opportunity to stick an American finger in the Iranian eye, official US policy was to secretly help Iraq as much as possible. One of
the ways in which the US officially helped Iraq was to covertly acquire
weapons systems.
Between early 1988 and July 1989, the Banca Nationale de! Lavoro (BNL), an Italian merchant bank with a branch in Atlanta-with
official US approval-processed more than 2500 letters of credit in
American and European for unspecified Iraqi customers. In April 1989,
BNL provided five and half million dollars in credit to lubricate the purchase of "300 tons of yarn" by Iraqi purchasers from the Turkish international trading house, Entrade. This and many other loans and letters
of credit went from Atlanta "straight to front companies in Switzerland
that were sending sensitive NATO-based equipment and technologies
to Baghdad for the Condor II mission project, Saddam's high-priority
ballistic missile that was at the top of the State Department's list of dangerous nuclear proliferation risks". The yarn deal was a covert attempt
to obfuscate the arms deals, and no yarn ever arrived in Iraq .37
Only a few years earlier, Saddam had used Swiss companies to
arrange military purchases, helping to covertly use Swiss assets to improve the equipment into sophisticated lethal killing machines. On one
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Alan Freidman, Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), p. 115.
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occasion, Iraq had contracted with the German aviation company MBB
(Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm) for helicopters, but as "attack helicopters" were on an international list of prohibited weapons, the Iraqi
regime couldn't get them directly; the deal was covered a paper sale to a
front in Indonesia . Initially disclosed to (then-West) German parliamentarians as "executive helicopters", the shipment left the Munich MBB
factory, "but they didn't go directly to Iraq [or to the advertised destination , Indonesia]. First they made a stopover in Switzerland, where a retrofit firm called Transair Swiss mounted Swiss-built [Oerlikon 20-mm
canons and] rapid-fire guns and other weaponry". The altered aircraft
were then sent into Austria for additional communications equipment,
where an Iraqi military transport plane fetched them - the choppers
never got close to Indonesia.38
On another occasion , Iraq contracted with Belgian and French engineers to build a secret facility at Akashat ostensibly for biomedical
research. As the project matured, the Belgians and French onsite staff
noticed a marked increase in Iraqi security, including uniformed guards,
new scrolls of barbed wire, and the imposition of travel restrictions on
the engineers. In December 1980, the Europeans discovered that the
Swiss firm of Alesa Alusuisse Engineering had begun work on a facility to process uranium. The project took on unnecessary secrecy when
the Belgians and other foreigners attempted to socialize with their new
Swiss neighbors , only to find that "the Swiss workers did not mix with
the others, their project [being] shroud[ed] in [unusual] secrecy". It was
disclosed much later that the western Iraqi projects at Akashat and Al
Qaim were fundamental parts of the Iraqi chemical weapons production
regime. 39 "Al Qain and Akashat had a perfectly legitimate purposeto develop Iraq's enormous phosphates deposits into an industry-but
they also fit a secret plan: to ensure the basic chemicals for Saddam
Hussein's poison gas machine" .40
The passage of time always lubricates the heavy doors of the information prison; clearly, more research needs to be done on the issue of
the use of Swiss territory, assets, and personnel on the global covert and
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Kenneth R Timmerman , The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1992), p. 72 .
39
Ibid , p. 98.
40
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clandestine missions issue. However, it will be obvious to scholar and
citizen alike that there is no ignoring the role Switzerland has played
and continues to play in the ongoing drama of the world's covert intrigues .41
- Brian Champion, Brigham Young University

41

Swiss diplomacy was instrumental in brokering peace in the Middle East. See
Douglas M Johnston , Jr. Religion, Terror and Error: US Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2011 ), p. 173. Appendix
C: Nicholas D Kristof, "Iran's Proposal for a 'Grand Bargain,"' On the Ground (blog),
New York Times April 28, 2007 http://kristof.blogs .nytimes .com/2007/04/28irans-proposa1-for-a-grand-bargain/ (accessed December 22, 2009). Documents are available at
http: //www.washingtonpost .com/wp-srv /world/documents/us_iran_ 1roadmap .pdf. Also
see Glenn Kesler, "2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks," Washington Post
February 14, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com and Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance:
The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran , and the US (New Haven: Yale , 2007), pp . 345-46.
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Book Review
by Kurt Winkler
Dungan, Nicholas. Gallatin: America's Swiss Founding Father. New
York: New York University Press, 2010. xiv, 193 pp. Bibliography,
notes, and index. $27.95.

Unfortunately, few monographs on Albert Gallatin ( 1761-1849) have
been produced in the last half century, but interest in the contribution of
this most eminent Swiss American has recently been revised largely by
Benedict de Tscharner's Albert Gallatin, and Nicholas Dungan's excellent study. As a senior advisor to the French Institute of International
and Strategic Relations and a former president of the French-American
Foundation in New York, Dungan brings his expertise on transatlantic
affairs to the study of Gallatin . Making good use of the Gallatin papers
at New York University, Dungan has produced the best academic study
to date on the Swiss American diplomat, politician , and educator.
Albert Gallatin grew up in the exhilarating atmosphere of Geneva
during the Enlightenment, which produced the important thinker, Jean
Jacques Rousseau. Coming from an advantaged background, Gallatin
had many opportunities to make his mark in the world, and some of his
contemporaries made their fortunes in France. But Gallatin was a romantic, similar to the Marquis de Lafayette, and he saw much to admire
in the potential of the nascent United States with its promise of freedom,
equality, and opportunity. He bravely came to Boston in 1780 at age
nineteen, when the outcome of the War of Independence was far from
certain, and he later settled in Pennsylvania.
Speaking little English upon his arrival, Gallatin soon mastered
the new language and made good use of his many talents to succeed in
his adopted country. He became active in politics and was chosen by
the state legislature to serve briefly as a US Senator. He later served two
terms as Representative to Congress, but he became most effective as
the Secretary of Treasury under Thomas Jefferson and James Madison ,
and Gallatin 's financial skills made possible the Louisiana Purchase
of 1803 . Madison used Gallatin as a diplomat, and the former Swiss

47

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol47/iss2/8

50

et al.: Full Issue
48

June 2011 SAHS Review

brought an end to the War of 1812 by negotiating the Treaty of Ghent
in 1814, which was a diplomatic triumph. Despite the fact that the war
had gone poorly for the United States, the peace treaty assured that no
territories were lost and no additional restrictions were placed on that
country.
Gallatin moved to New York late in life and was instrumental in
founding New York University as a means of offering an advanced education even to people of modest means. While Gallatin's contribution
to the United States was considerable, he was very disturbed about the
harsh treatment of the American Indians. In an attempt to understand
the native cultures, he established the study of native ethnicity to appreciate the peoples who were being destroyed by white Americans. Albert
Gallatin was a very admirable man, and Dungan's study is a worthy appreciation of the Swiss American and his many contributions.
- Kurt Winkler, Emporia State University
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Book Review
by Barry Maxfield
Todd, Vincent H. Von Graffenried: Founding of New Bern. Spartanburg: The Reprint Company, 2010. 434 pages. Cost $50. ISBN
0-87152-141-5.

There were many ethnic groups who settled America, such as the
Swiss and the Germans. But little is written on their history. It has become increasingly important to analyze history from their viewpoints.
Todd opens the preface of this book with an assertion which leads the
reader to want a new perspective on history "of our [U.S.] white population there are at least twenty seven percent of German birth or extraction , while those of English origin number but thirty percent."(page 5)
He then asks the question, why is history written from an English perspective? He gives the answer that Early American history was written
by men from New England.
Todd has complied, edited, commented and, with the help of Julius
Goebel, translated manuscripts written by Christoph Von Graffenried, a
Swiss Bailiff who led a company to establish a colony in 18 th century
colonial America. The book includes a general history of the German
Palatine with some insight into Swiss life in Bern.
It covers topics which include reasons for the Revolutionary War,
feudal systems in America, labor contracts, colonial travel , and colonial
politics, Swiss immigrants in North Carolina and Virginia and white
relations with Indians.
The figures who play a role in this book and are of interest to
historians: Christoph Von Graffenried, Anton Von Graffenried , Thomas
Cromwell, Sir William Waller, Joshua Kochertal, Franz Louis Michel,
John Lawson, Georg Ritter and King Charles II.
The editors construct this narrative around two printed Graffenried
manuscripts, one in German and one in French, which are included in
the book in their respective languages. The book includes an appendix
which gives a short vocabulary of older English words and German and
49
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French words with translations.
The book is laid out in five chapters: the historical introduction ,
the German manuscript, the English translation of the manuscript, the
French manuscript and the English translation of it. This seems a well
thought out methodology to present this material.
In the historical introduction, the editor lays out a well-documented discussion of the Palatine migration or the movement of Germans
of the Palatinate. The discussion is heavy in the Reformation, Counter-Reformation and English politics. It also covers Graffenried's early
history through his travels in America.
The historical introduction is broken into sub-chapters inside the
chapter. These sub-chapters are not listed in the table of contents, but
are indexed at the back of the book. The sub-chapters have leads such
as "The Decisive Cause of the Palatine Migration" and "Survey of the
Final Disposal of the Palatines." In Part I Chapter I, Graffenried enters
the picture with a history of his early life, bringing the reader into the
year 1661.
This book is meant for the serious historian who is seeking to understand the other views of the Early American experience. This book is
also important in that it highlights the problems that caused the American Colonists to become restless under English rule, ultimately culminating in the War for Independence. It makes the point that the Swiss
and German colonists had the same discontent and problems as their
English counterparts. It is substantial proof of the place the Swiss and
German people had in the weaving of the ethnic tapestry of America .
- Barry Maxfield, Utah Valley University
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Book Review
by Barbaraella Frazier
Perret-Clermont, Anne-Nelly and Jean-Marc Barrelet, eds. Jean
Piaget and Neuchatel: the Learner and the Scholar. New York:
Psychology Press, 2008. xv, 240 pp. ISBN: 978-1-84169-657-7,
$84.27.

Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was a psychologist, epistemologist, logician,
and social theorist. He was born in Neuchatel , Switzerland, and died
in Geneva , and he is one of the most significant psychologists of the
twentieth century. Piaget's empirical work and theoretical conceptions
changed the way psychologists and scholars think about psychological
development in children. Leslie Smith, Emeritus Professor, Lancaster
University stated that his influence on developmental psychology can
be compared to Shakespeare 's influence on English literature in the sixteenth century.
Originally published in French as Jean Piaget et Neuchatel
:l 'apprenti et le savant in 1996 during the centenary celebration of
Piaget's birth, the book illuminates his early years. Written by multiple
authors- including psychologists, arc hi vis ts, and historians- the scholars shed light on the early development of one of the early development
scholars .
Although the editors state in the preface that the intention of the
book is not to explain Piaget or discern his career as determined by social or personal destiny, the book does indeed expand our understanding
of Piaget's background. Neuchatel's political, religious, cultural, scientific and educational climate is discussed in multiple chapters . Arthur
Piaget, Piaget's father, as well as other influential people in Piaget's
life, are described and discussed. The ideas within the book are well
supported. The authors build upon the work of Piaget scholars and draw
on research from primary sources such as letters and writings by Piaget
in his youth. The book focuses on Piaget's maturation and early years
in his hometown of Neuchatel as well as his studies, both in his early
schooling and at the University Neuchatel. It also expands upon Piag51
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et's later life and work such as the reception of his early ideas outside of
Switzerland.
This book is an excellent addition to biographic and psychological
literature. Piaget theories are described and discussed in detail in every
child psychology textbook, but knowing the history and maturation of
this eminent psychologist can widen the understanding of the person
and his theories.
- Barbaraella Frazier, Brigham Young University
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